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Abstract: When a user logs on to a recognition based authentication system, he or she is presented with a number of 
images, one of which is their pass image and the others are distractors. The user must recognise and select their own image 
to enter the system. If any of the distractors is too similar to the target, the user is likely to become confused and may well 
choose a distractor by mistake. 
It is simple for humans to rule on image similarity but such a labour intensive approach hinders the wider uptake of these 
mechanisms. Automating image similarity detection is a challenging problem but somewhat easier when the images being 
used are minimal image types such as hand drawn doodles and Mikons constructed using a computer tool. 
We have developed an algorithm, which has been reported earlier, to automatically detect if two doodle images are 
similar. This paper reports a new experiment to discover the amount of similarity in collections of doodles and Mikons, 
from a human perspective. This information is used to improve the algorithm and confirm that it also works well with 
Mikons. 
Keywords: Authentication, visual, image, recognition, distractor, similarity, algorithm. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The password is the authenticator of choice for most 
modern software applications. Unfortunately it is deeply 
flawed in an environment where computer users access 
many systems and have far too many “secret” passwords to 
remember. The obvious consequence is reuse of passwords 
[1], insecure recording of passwords [2] and use of weak 
passwords [3] which are easily broken by determined 
intruders. 
 These facts have been well known for almost 30 years 
[4]. The use of the password persists for the very simple 
reason that it is by far the easiest option for system 
developers and support staff. The mechanisms and 
mechanics of passwords are well understood and relatively 
easy to police. Furthermore, much of the burden resulting 
from the unsuitability of the password falls on the end-users 
[5]. Some financial burden falls onto companies who have to 
man call centres, many of whose calls are related to 
forgotten passwords [6]. 
 Unfortunately, many alternatives to passwords have not 
yet demonstrated that they are in a position to improve the 
situation to any significant extent. Biometrics seem to have 
limited validity for a web-based system when the additional 
requirements of a biometric reader and privacy concerns [7] 
are considered. Some organisations, in an attempt to harden 
the password, require two-factor authentication, a token such 
as a card accompanied by a password [8]. Other 
organisations, mostly banks, issue their users with one-time  
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password mechanisms [9]. These are all very well, but are 
far from being universally usable due to the cost and the 
possibility of the token or device being mislaid, stolen or 
damaged. 
 It is also worth considering password users. They are far 
more heterogeneous than the original password user of 40 
years ago: the young technophile with excellent cognitive 
and memory skills. The computer user of today ranges from 
the young to the very old, from the highly educated to the 
barely literate, from the disabled to the dyslexic. The 
password requirement, of exact and precise unaided recall, is 
simply unrealistic for many of these users. 
 An alternative approach to authentication is to use 
recognition rather than recall to provide the “password”. In a 
recognition based system, the user’s “password”, the target is 
displayed on the screen, together with a number of distractor 
“passwords”. The collection of target and distractors is 
called a challenge set. The user just needs to recognise his 
or her “password”, rather than recall it from scratch. In 
almost all cases, the “password” is actually a pass image, 
since it is easier for the user to find and recognise an image 
rather than the sort of text that would make a good 
password. The latter task is akin to searching for text in a 
table, which is obviously more difficult than searching for an 
object in a grid. An early example of such a system that has 
been used in industry is the PassFace system
1
, although long 
term evaluation has suggested some flaws [10]. 
 The following section will introduce recognition based 
authentication. Section 3 outlines our research in using 
image based authentication mechanisms and explains our 
focus on image similarity. Section 4 outlines our algorithm 
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for automating similarity detection. Section 5 describes a 
new experiment to determine the amount of similarity in 
collections of simple images and applies this information to 
our algorithm. Section 6 concludes. 
2. RECOGNITION BASED AUTHENTICATION 
USING IMAGES 
 When a user registers with an image recognition based 
systems they are either provided with a pass image or several 
pass images by the system or supply these images 
themselves. The latter option maximises memorability but 
can also makes it easier for a potential intruder to guess 
the identity of the image password. Then when they log in 
they must recognise their image or images as described 
earlier. Initially the protagonists of this kind of mechanism 
relied solely on the picture superiority effect [11] to enhance 
the memorability. Unfortunately this effect is easily negated 
if the system is not designed with due care [12]. 
 In order to design these systems for maximum efficacy, 
we need first to understand how humans engage in visual  
search. The literature on visual search makes it clear that it is 
not a predictable process [13]. The eye flits and fixates on 
the images in the challenge set in a completely random and 
unpredictable fashion, often revisiting distractor images 
before finding the target [14]. The process tends to be serial 
if the challenge set is composed of heterogeneous images 
[15] but will not necessarily start at the top left corner and 
proceed to bottom right. It is impossible, therefore, to 
predict how long it will take for someone to locate their own 
image. Various aspects will impact on the efficiency of the 
process, including the visual complexity of the image [16], 
the number of, and overall, colours the images share [17, 18], 
the image size (which enhances discriminability [19]), the 
number of images in the challenge set [20], the similarity of 
the images to each other (both in terms of semantics and 
syntax) [21, 22], the age of the viewer [23], the genre and 
task being carried out [24].  
3. USING SIMPLE IMAGE TYPES IN AUTHENTICATION 
 The choice of image type for image-based authentication 
is crucial. Different image types have been trialled, with 
some demonstrating more efficacy than others: faces [10], 
abstract art [25], system provided or user-taken photographs 
[26, 27], icons [28], doodles [29] and Mikons [30]. A 
comparison between photographs, user photographs and 
doodles showed that doodles performed best in terms of 
memorability [31]. 
 Our research has focused primarily on the use of what 
we call simple image types, of which doodles and Mikons are 
instances. These images have superior memorability because 
they have been provided by the users. As explained in [30], 
the actions engaged in during production of these images 
enhance memorability. 
3.1. Experiences & Issues 
 One simple image type is a doodle, or simple sketch. A 
system using doodles as part of the authentication mechanism 
which controls access to a small community website has been 
running for 5 years now [29]. 
 Users enroll by filling out a form which requires them to 
draw a doodle and provide other details. The doodle is 
manually scanned and the resulting image file uploaded. 
Doodles are very memorable but the success of such a 
scheme depends on the availability of a scanner during 
enrolment. Fig. (1) shows a collection of typical doodles, 
some of which are similar. 
 
Fig. (1). A Collection of Doodles. 
 The logical next step was to allow the user to create a 
simple image using a browser based drawing tool. A mouse 
is not really precise enough to allow the user to produce a 
good freehand sketch, an electronic doodle, and so most 
browser based drawing tools let the user construct simple 
images from a collection of templates. Fig. (2) shows the 
Mikon engine, with an example of the templates shown on 
the right. We have used the Mikon tool
2
 in an experiment 
reported in [30]. Mikon is short for My Icon, and these 
simple images have proved to be just as memorable as 
doodles. Fig. (3) shows a collection of typical Mikons. 
3.2. Ways to Attack Recognition Based Systems 
 The aspect that makes recognition based systems easier 
to use: the fact that the “password” is displayed on the 
screen for easy identification also makes it easier to attack. 
There are a number of ways in which recognition based 
systems are vulnerable to attack: 
• Brute Force — Recognition based systems help the 
user to remember their pass image by showing it 
to them, along with distractors. This will also help 
the attacker, since they know that one of the images 
shown will be the correct pass image. This is 
vulnerable to a brute force attack if the attacker is 
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allowed to try a number of variations of image choices 
without hindrance. This can be thwarted by requiring 
the user to provide several pass images with a series 
of challenge sets, increasing the difficulty for the 
attacker. In one of our systems, for example, each user 
must provide four pass images, each part of a 4 x 4 
challenge set. In addition, if authentication fails 
several times in a row then re-enrolment may be 
required. 
• Denial of Service — The re-enrolment requirement 
used to guard against a brute force attack can also 
make a denial of service attack possible. An attacker 
can deliberately try to log in as someone else, failing 
enough times to force the victim to re-enroll. Thus, 
requiring re-enrolment to avoid a brute force attack 
should be used with care. 
 
Fig. (2). Drawing Mikons 
 
Fig. (3). A Collection of Mikons. 
• Intersection Attack — If the system uses varying 
distractors ie. a different set each time the challenge 
set is displayed, the intruder can simply keep 
refreshing the display to see which image does not 
change. This is thwarted by fixing the distractors at 
registration. 
• Shoulder-Surfing — Since the images are displayed 
and the user needs to identify the image, most often 
by clicking on it, it is possible for someone to 
observe which choices have been made. Some 
recognition-based systems allow users to enter their 
choice by means of the keyboard rather than the 
mouse, and this makes it much harder for an observer 
to identify the target image. 
• Social Engineering — If the user is permitted to supply 
their own “secret” images, it might be possible for an 
intruder to guess which images belong to a particular 
person. This is a problem for images such as 
photographs but less so for minimal image types such 
as sketches (doodles) or Mikons. These are provided 
by the user but are much less likely to be easily 
attributed to the artist. 
3.3. Choosing Distractors 
 There are a number of aspects to consider when choosing 
distractor images for a challenge set. The first question is 
the source of the distractor images. If they are selected from 
a system provided pool of “good” distractors then user 
supplied target images may well stand out as noticeably 
different. Thus we choose our distractors from the collection 
of target images provided by existing users. 
 Another aspect of choosing distractors is that of 
objectionable images. It would be a big drawback if one of 
the distractor images, seen every time the user logs on, was 
objectionable to him or her, for whatever reason. This is a 
difficult problem to confront, since what is objectionable to 
one person, as a distractor, may be perfectly acceptable to the 
person who supplied it as a target. This will be an issue for 
all systems that allow users to provide their own pass images. 
Asking an administrator to reject objectionable images when 
they are registered would place a large administrative burden 
on the system without solving the problem. There will 
always be images that an administrator finds acceptable but 
to which a user objects, based on individual perspectives. In 
our systems we resolve this problem by letting users ask for 
distractors to be replaced. 
3.4. Avoiding Similar Distractors 
 The distractors to be used can thus be chosen at random 
from the larger set of potential distractors, but this has the 
disadvantage that distractors similar to the target image will 
be chosen from time to time. This could obviously cause 
problems for the user when they log in, since they might 
choose the similar looking distractor by mistake. On the 
other hand, if the challenge set contained two similar 
distractors, it would not confuse the user, since neither would 
be similar to the target. It could however help the attacker 
since the two similar distractors would not be the target. 
 In addition, simple image types exacerbate the similarity 
problem. In terms of doodles, we found that many users 
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would draw a simple stick man. If one of the distractors 
were also a stick man, undeniably not their stick man but 
definitely a contender, users took longer to identify their 
doodle, and often chose the wrong one. Mikon images are 
also relatively simple, and the Mikon drawing tool offers a 
number of templates which users can incorporate into the 
Mikons. 
 Some users just chose one of the templates, without 
elaboration, as their pass image. This leads to a raised 
incidence of similarity. However, the simplicity of these 
images facilitates both the prevalence of the problem and the 
possibility of affecting a solution. Image similarity is judged 
based on visual similarity and subjective aspects such as 
semantic context, assigned labels and visual ability. 
According to the picture superiority effect [11], the viewer 
will have attached a label to the target image, which may be 
brought to mind during the search process. The search will 
therefore be guided by both semantic and perceptual 
similarity matchings. 
 We could try to eliminate similarity related to semantic 
category and assigned labels by classifying and labelling 
each image and then choosing each distractor from a 
different category and ensuring that labels differ. This is 
extremely time consuming and, unfortunately, shown to be 
unreliable [32]. 
 On the other hand, we could automatically eliminate 
visual similarity by using an algorithm which detects it. In 
this case, a potential distractor image is chosen at random 
and checked automatically to see if it is similar to the target 
and any distractors already chosen. If it is, then it is 
discarded and another candidate chosen. This process 
continues until the challenge set is complete. 
3.5. False Negatives and False Positives 
 The effectiveness of the similarity algorithm is measured 
by comparing its decisions with those of a human 
experimenter. The human determination of similarity is 
subjective and there is also the question of how similar two 
images have to be before they are classified as similar. In our 
experiments we used the following subjective definition of 
similarity. Two images are similar if the experimenter thinks 
they would cause confusion to a user when he or she logs in. 
No algorithm will give perfect results, and a failure by the 
algorithm, judged against the experimental decision, will be 
either a false negative or a false positive. 
 A false negative will occur when the algorithm decides 
that two images are not similar when in fact they are judged 
to be similar. This means that an image will be accepted as 
part of the challenge set when in fact it is similar to one of the 
existing images. This is undesirable. 
 A false positive occurs when two images are said to be 
similar when they are not. This would result in a distractor 
being rejected as similar, when in fact it could have been 
included in the challenge set. In general this will not cause a 
problem, since any dissimilar image can be used in the 
challenge set. There is nothing special about the falsely 
rejected image compared with the other images that are 
included in the challenge set. 
 There will be a problem if the false positive rate is too 
high and unduly restricts the choice of distractors. In an 
extreme example, if the algorithm classified all pairs of 
images as similar without actually examining them then it 
would be impossible to choose any distractors, since all 
possible distractors would be classified as similar to the 
target doodle. In a more realistic example, if the false 
positive rate were too high, it might be difficult to choose 
enough distractors. Also in this case, a small number of 
images will be clearly different from almost all other images 
and appear in a large number of challenge sets, potentially 
helping an attacker. 
 In summary, the algorithm should be tailored to produce 
as few false negatives as possible, while at the same time not 
making the false positive rate so high that it becomes 
difficult to choose a varied set of distractors. 
4. SIMILARITY ALGORITHM 
 Details of the algorithm, together with experiments to test 
its validity have been reported in [32]. The algorithm 
measures three aspects of each simple image: the number of 
separate black regions (NB), white regions (NW) and 
number of joins (NJ) between lines. Two images are 
compared by calculating the weighted sum of the absolute 
differences of these three measures. If this weighted sum is 
below a given threshold (T) then they are classified as 
similar. In summary, image1 and image2 are classified as 
similar if 
wB |NB1 ? NB2 | + wW |NW1 ? NW2 | + wJ |NJ1 ? NJ2 | < T 
 The experiment reported in [32] used doodle images. 100 
challenge sets were constructed using the algorithm and 
another 100 by choosing the distractors at random. Several 
experimenters were asked to examine all the challenge sets 
and report any pairs of similar doodles. 
 That experiment clearly showed the effectiveness of the 
algorithm for selecting doodle distractors. 
5. AN EXPERIMENT TO DETECT TOTAL 
SIMILARITY IN A COLLECTION OF SIMPLE 
IMAGES 
 In this paper we report an additional experiment with the 
following three goals: 
• To determine from a human perspective how many 
pairs of doodles in a collection are similar. 
• To use this information to investigate the effects of 
varying the weights and threshold in the algorithm on 
the false positive rate, false negative rate and  
available choice of distractors. 
• To test the effectiveness of the algorithm with a  
collections of Mikons. 
5.1. Subjective Similarity 
 The first part of the experiment was to determine, from a 
human perspective, which simple images appeared similar. 
Asking an experimenter to pass judgment on all possible pairs 
in a large enough set of images is not feasible. Preliminary 
experiments showed that an all pairs investigation of a set 
containing more that 50 simple images, and hence 1225 
pairs, could not be carried out because of investigator 
fatigue. A set of 50 images also did not contain enough 
similar images to make this investigation worthwhile. 
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 The approach adopted was to build a program that let an 
experimenter move the images in a collection around, 
grouping similar ones near to each other. Similar pairs were 
then labeled as such and recorded by the program. 
 We have a collection of 549 doodles and from these 300 
were selected at random to be the subject of this 
investigation. 81 similar pairs were identified and out of the 
300 doodles, 60 were similar to another doodles and 240 were 
unique. The experiment took around 2 hours, with most of 
the time spent rearranging the doodles. 
 The same approach was used with our collection of 
2808 Mikons. 658 were chosen at random and 87 similar 
pairs identified. 70 Mikons were similar to another Mikon, 
while 588 were unique. 
5.2. Experiments with the Algorithm 
 The second part of the experiment involved writing a 
program that checked all the possible pairs of images and 
compared the subjective experimental determination of 
similarity with that produced by the algorithm. It was 
relatively easy to change the weightings and threshold so that 
a large number of different combinations could be 
investigated. 
 The variables are the weights wB : wW : wJ , which must 
sum to 1, and the threshold T. The derived quantities are N, 
the number of false negatives, P the percentage of false 
positives and C, the minimum choice. N is a relatively small 
number compared with the 44,850 possible doodle pairs and 
the 216,153 possible Mikon pairs. P as a percentage 
corresponds to a much larger number of pairs. The choice 
for each image is the number of other images classified as 
not similar to it by the algorithm. C is the minimum of all 
these numbers. 
 Changing the weights corresponds to investigating the 
relative importance of NB, NW and NJ in the algorithm. 
Increasing T will increase P while decreasing N. C is 
inversely related to P, since increasing the false positive rate 
will decrease the choice. C is also dependent on the size of 
the set of images. The results as reported in Tables 1 and 2 
specify wB : wW : wJ and T and report N, P and C. This 
information is reported in a different way in Tables 3 and 4. 
Here a target value of P is chosen and the value of T that 
produces the closest result reported. In some cases a linearly 
interpolated value of T is recorded when no actual value is 
close enough. 
5.3. Single Measure Results 
 Firstly, the effects of NB, NW and NJ was examined in 
isolation using weights of 1:0:0, 0:1:0 and 0:0:1. The results 
are summarised in Tables 1 and 2. A threshold of -1 
classifies all doodles as different, corresponding to a 
random choice of distractors. 
 These results also appear in Tables 3 and 4, which 
record the effects of targeting a false positive rate of 33% 
and 20% respectively. Two interesting conclusions can be 
drawn: 
• The results for doodles and Mikons are very similar. 
• The black region count is less effective than the 
others. This is best seen in Tables 3 and 4, where the 
black region count produces a much higher level of 
false negatives than the others. 
Table 1. Single Measure Results for Doodles 
 
Black White Joins 
T 
N P C N P C N P C 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
81 
47 
26 
11 
8 
6 
5 
0 
22 
43 
61 
74 
81 
87 
299 
175 
91 
42 
17 
13 
7 
81 
55 
35 
26 
15 
7 
6 
0 
7 
22 
34 
44 
52 
60 
299 
255 
187 
139 
99 
68 
45 
81 
68 
44 
31 
21 
17 
13 
0 
5 
14 
24 
33 
41 
48 
299 
267 
225 
184 
145 
111 
87 
 
Table 2. Single Measure Results for Mikons 
 
Black White Joins 
T 
N P C N P C N P C 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
87 
31 
17 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
31 
54 
69 
78 
86 
90 
657 
316 
142 
59 
30 
16 
7 
87 
59 
32 
24 
20 
9 
7 
0 
8 
22 
33 
43 
52 
60 
657 
557 
406 
294 
203 
145 
108 
87 
65 
51 
34 
24 
18 
12 
0 
4 
13 
22 
30 
38 
44 
657 
603 
517 
433 
352 
284 
203 
 
Table 3. Results with a False Positive Rate of 33% 
 
Doodles Mikons 
Weights 
N T C N T C 
1 : 0 : 0 
0 : 1 : 0 
0 : 0 : 1 
37 
24 
21 
0.5 
2.0 
3.0 
133 
139 
146 
31 
24 
24 
0.0 
2.0 
3.0 
316 
294 
352 
0 : .25 : .75 
0 : .50 : .50 
0 : .75 : .25 
18 
18 
21 
3.4 
3.0 
2.8 
135 
132 
130 
20 
19 
23 
3.6 
3.2 
2.8 
302 
303 
294 
 
Table 4. Results with a False Positive Rate of 20% 
 
Doodles Mikons 
Weights 
N T C N T C 
1 : 0 : 0 
0 : 1 : 0 
0 : 0 : 1 
48 
35 
30 
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
173 
191 
189 
50 
32 
34 
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
400 
406 
433 
0 : .25 : .75 
0 : .50 : .50 
0 : .75 : .25 
32 
25 
21 
2.2 
2.2 
1.8 
194 
175 
180 
33 
28 
29 
2.4 
2.2 
2.0 
424 
393 
393 
.17 : .66 : .17 33 1.67 188    
 
5.4. The Right Mix of NW and NJ 
 Following on from this, we investigated the effects of just 
including NW and NJ in different amounts, using weights of 
0:.25:.75, 0:.5:.5, 0:.75:.25. These results are also reported in  
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Tables 3 and 4. The last line in Table 4 uses the weights and 
threshold from [32], which also produced a false positive 
rate of 20%. 
 The simple conclusion to be drawn from these results is 
that the algorithm is not very sensitive to the values of wW and 
wJ . Setting them both to 0.5 would be an appropriate choice. 
5.5. Varying the Threshold 
 The choice of threshold T depends on the desired value 
for the minimum choice C. Empirical results for our systems, 
where we must provide 60 distractors for each user, suggests 
that C should be no less than 200. Other systems with a 
different number of distractors per user will have different 
criteria for C. Increasing C beyond this value will not produce 
a noticeably more varied set of distractors but will increase 
the number of false negatives, which is undesirable. The 
value of C also depends on the size of the set of images. 
 Looking at the results for our set of 300 doodles, we 
notice that a threshold of 3.0 (giving P=33%) reduced N to 
about 25% of the random choice value. Unfortunately C is 
around 130, which is too low. Using a threshold of 2.2 
(P=20%) increases the choice to around 180 but also 
increases N to around 30% of the random choice value. A 
threshold of 2.0 is about right for a set of 300 images. 
 Our set of 658 Mikons generates plenty of choice even 
when T=3.2 (P=33%), which is not surprising given the 
increased number of images to choose from. In this case N 
equals 22% of the random choice value. Raising the 
threshold to 4.0 gives a choice just over 200, with N=16, 
corresponding to 18% of the random choice value. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 This paper has discussed recognition based user 
authentication systems using pass images. The focus of our 
research is developing an algorithm for constructing a 
challenge set by choosing distractors that are not similar to the 
target image or each other. Details of the algorithm were 
presented in [32] where it was used with a collection of 
doodles. 
 This paper reports a new experiment to determine the 
amount of similarity in collections of doodles and Mikons, 
as determined by human experimenters. This information 
has been used to improve the algorithm and give a more 
comprehensive estimate of how much better the algorithm is 
than random choice. 
 Our new experiment showed that 80% of a collection of 
300 doodles were unique, while 89% of a larger collection 
of 658 Mikons were unique. This indicates that a typical 
user is more likely to create a unique Mikon than a unique 
doodle. We cannot say more than this because of the 
different demographics of the doodle and Mikon users. 
 Our work with the algorithm shows that the black region 
count can be discarded and the white region count and 
number of joins combined with equal weights. In systems 
which produce 60 distractors per user, the best value for the 
threshold ranges from 2.0 for a small set of 300 images to 
4.0 for a larger set of around 700 images. The threshold 
must be adjusted to provide an acceptable amount of choice 
when constructing challenge sets. When used with the larger 
set of images, the algorithm only generates around 20% of 
the undesirable false negatives compared with a random 
choice. Even with a small set of images, the algorithm still 
only produces around 30% false negatives when compared 
with a random choice. 
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